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Introduction
April 25, 1985. Shortly after sunrise, shivering people gather around flagpoles 
near the churches in Moluccan wards of small towns all over the Netherlands. A 
brief ceremony of prayers, speeches, and singing culminates in raising the flag of 
a country which today exists only in the hearts of the participants. Immediately 
after the ceremony, the people board hired buses, climb onto trains, or pile into 
private cars to begin their annual pilgrimage to the Houtrusthallen exhibition 
center in The Hague, the political capital of the Netherlands. On this day, they 
commemorate the 35th Anniversary of the proclamation of independence of the 
Republic of South Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, generally referred to as 
RMS), while simultaneously lamenting their thirty-fourth year of exile in the 
Netherlands.
The annual gathering has essentially two objectives. The first is to remind 
the Dutch people, and particularly the Dutch government, of their continuing 
obligation to aid Moluccans in the establishment of a free homeland, independent 
of Indonesia, to which the exiles in Holland will then voluntarily repatriate. The 
second objective is a reaffirmation of those goals commonly referred to as the 
"RMS ideal" or "RMS ideology" 1 among the exile community itself, and a show of
* This analysis was carried out while the author worked at the Center for the 
Study of Social Conflicts (COMT), University of Leiden, The Netherlands (1983-85), 
conducting research on socialization and identity formation among Moluccans in 
the Netherlands. The work was supported by a grant from the Dutch Ministry of 
Welfare, Public Health and Culture (WVC) and executed in cooperation with the 
Moluccan Advisory Council (IWM). An earlier version of this article was presented 
at the South East Asian Studies Research Seminar, University of Kent, Canterbury, 
England, December 7, 1984. The author is indebted for helpful comments and 
criticisms to Andrd KBbben, Roy Ellen, Benedict Anderson, Ferry Siwabessy, and 
Lies de Fretes.
1. Little attention has been paid to the form this free republic should take, 
other than what was outlined in the provisional constitution dating to 1950, which 
has been printed repeatedly in publications on the RMS written by those close to 
the Moluccan cause. For a complete reprint, see Bung Penonton, De Zuidmolukse 
Republiek (Amsterdam: Buijten and Schipperheijn, 1977), pp. 246-60. Many Moluccans 
feel that this is an issue which can be discussed only when the RMS has become 
a reality, and that it must involve Moluccans living back home. Concerning the 
relationship a free RMS would maintain with the Netherlands, there has been no 
public discussion. It appears that a close economic tie but not political dependency,
23
24
solidarity both internally and externally.
Over the years, the festivities have become routine: the grand entrance of 
the RMS exile government is followed by a military flag-raising ceremony and the 
emotional singing of the national anthem by the thousands in the hall. A speech 
by RMS President J. A. Manusama is usually followed by orations from a prominent 
Dutch supporter, and more recently from leaders of other Indonesian independence 
movements, namely Aceh, Papua (Irian Barat), and Timor Deli (East Timor).
During the speeches, the sweltering hall hums like an active beehive. Only 
the dignitaries in the front rows remain in their seats. The crowd swarms back 
and forth, clogging the aisles, huddling in corners, and flocking around food 
stands. Everywhere people exuberantly greet friends, acquaintances, and relatives. 
Most of the speeches they have heard before, but if anyone says something new 
that touches their hearts, they reward him with thunderous applause. This, 
however, is the time of reunion and social gossip, a gigantic family feast that 
contributes more to group solidarity and expresses better group vitality than any 
speech from the podium.
Various traditional dancing and singing groups appearing on stage in the 
second half of the afternoon reflect the prevailing mood of the crowd, a mixture 
of melancholy and joy. A sense of loss and despair, overwhelming homesickness 
for the far-away islands, frustration, but also abundant joy of life, mirth, and the 
happiness of being among friends can be read on the faces of old and young, in 
rapid succession or simultaneously.
The annual ritual could seem merely a replica of earlier ceremonies except 
that the proud and erect President Manusama has become frailer as the years pass 
by and the girth of the uniformed men on stage has increased ever so slightly. 
And as time ticks cruelly away, the ranks of the old soldiers are becoming thinner, 
the hopes of those left behind more faded, and the crowd attending more sparse.
However, in 1985, there was a marked difference. Many more young people 
were attending than in previous years. Not only did they come to participate in 
the RMS festivities, but in the morning they marched by the thousands through 
the streets of The Hague, shouting RMS slogans. The police had sealed off the 
street on which the Indonesian Embassy is located, but when the demonstrators 
reached its vicinity they could not suppress their pent-up emotions. Groups of 
youths broke away from the demonstration and stormed through police lines to 
vent their anger and frustration in front of the gates of the embassy. Rocks 
flew across the fence smashing several windows, before the demonstrators finally 
left peacefully, prodded by their own leaders to rejoin the main formation and 
eventually disperse in front of the Houtrusthallen. 2
Over the years more and more youths had stayed away from the reunion, 
disillusioned with the lack of progress of the RMS struggle. They had lost faith 
in a RMS leadership perceived as timid and inept, and they had become dispirited 
by the realization of the fruitlessness of their own often violent attempts in the 
sixties and seventies to force the hand of the Dutch government and gain interna­
ls deemed desirable. People are even more hazy when discussing the future RMS 
relationships with Indonesia, but some envision that similar relations to those 
outlined for the Netherlands can eventually come about.
2. A compliment has to be paid to the hopelessly outnumbered Dutch police. By 
refraining from using force or calling in reinforcements, they managed to keep 
tempers sufficiently low to prevent any outbreak of violence.
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tional support. Yet, the 35th Anniversary was for many of them sufficiently 
special to invite their return. Not because they suddenly had found renewed faith 
in the movement, but, as almost all those I polled stated, they returned to honor 
their parents and elders.
Although the demonstration and subsequent festivities evoked nostalgic images 
of their fierce struggles, it was another kind of nostalgia that prevailed. There 
is growing realization among the young 3 that, with the steady dying away of the 
members of the first generation, an era of Moluocan exile history is coming to a 
close. They further realize that their community is changing ever more rapidly. 
By coming out in force on this occasion to show solidarity and appreciation for 
their elders' sufferings, they were reaffirming their own links with the past and a 
continuous commitment to the Moluccan community in the face of these changes 
and an uncertain future.
In the following discussion, I want to analyze some of the major developments 
in the Moluccan exile community, particularly among the former members of the 
so-called KNIL4and their families, since the arrival of this group in the Nether­
lands in 1951, with a special focus on the impact of the notorious hijackings in 
the mid-1970s. It is my contention that, while the hijackings (and related activi­
ties) utterly failed to advance RMS aspirations, the resulting shock effect jolted 
the Moluccan community out of its sociocultural paralysis, accelerating many 
already ongoing changes, and, most importantly, forcing the Moluocan community 
to reevaluate their position in Dutch society and consider new directions parallel 
to or even beyond the RMS ideal.
Brief History of Moluccans in Holland
Let me being with a brief historical outline. The Moluccas, an island group 
in the eastern region of the Indonesian archipelago, were once fabled for their 
spices. In the nineteenth century, the region experienced a drastic economic 
decline. Dutch interests shifted to Java and other islands. The task of conquer­
ing, pacifying, and controlling those areas was in the hands of a colonial army of 
native and European soldiers led by Dutch officers, the forementioned KNIL.
Not unlike the British use of the Christian Karen in Burma, the Dutch also 
preferred to recruit from ethnic minorities adhering to Christianity such as the 
Menadonese and Moluccans, since it was felt that they were the most trustworthy. 
Of all groups, the Moluccans most justified the trust put into them. Not only 
were they fierce and daring soldiers—often used as advance troops in trouble 
spots such as Aceh—but they also developed an unquestioning, if not fanatical 
loyalty to the Dutch, especially to the House of Orange. Their identification with 
the Dutch was so complete that they referred to themselves as "Black Dutchmen" 
(Belanda Hitam). 5 Just like average Dutchmen, they came to see those groups in
3. The term "youth" in Moluccan society is liberally applied to people in the 
18-40 age group.
4. Koninklijke Nederlands Indisch Leger or Royal Netherlands Indies Army.
5. As Ben van Kaam (The South Moluccans [London: Hurst, 1980], p. 4) points 
out, the Moluccan tendency to refer to themselves as "Black Dutchmen" ". . . 
generated in the Dutch both irritation ('Who do they think they are?’) and satis­
faction ('loyal soldiers') in turn."
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the Netherlands Indies who rebelled and whom they helped to subjugate as "their 
enemies." 6
During the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands Indies in World War II, the 
Moluccans did not abandon their masters. Many of those who were not captured 
fought valiantly in the underground and those who were put into the camps 
shared their meager rations with the Dutch prisoners-of-war, saving many Dutch 
lives. When Netherlands forces returned after Japan’s defeat, most Moluocan 
soldiers immediately rejoined ranks to fight against the Indonesian independence 
movement. Their numbers were swelled by many new recruits from the Moluccas. 7
The transfer of sovereignty late in 1949 and the subsequent dismantling of 
the federal state in favor of a unitary Republic of Indonesia led to mass confu­
sion and increasing panic not only among Moluccan KNIL soldiers but also among 
the general population back in the Moluccas. Although there was a sizable pro- 
Indonesian movement, many Christians carefully put their Dutch flags away in the 
desperate but vain hope that the Dutch would after all return. Many feared that 
the Javanese would take revenge for the role the Ambonese played in the colonial 
empire, and rumors spread that all Christians would be circumcised and forcefully 
converted to Islam. Federalists like Manusama, a Dutch-educated civil engineer 
and teacher who was born on Java and only in 1947 set foot for the first time on 
Ambon, convinced many that only a federal state would assure them some measure 
of autonomy from Javanese domination.
When the federal bubble burst, the Ambonese panicked—according to all 
accounts, including their own. They declared their independence on April 25, 
1950, claiming as their territory the Central and Southeast Moluccas. 8 This
6. Hendrik Kraemer, From Missionfield to Independent Church (The Hague: Boeken- 
centrum, 1958). Kraemer, a keenly observant missionary, also discusses the feelings 
of superiority, based on religion, felt by Central Moluccan Christians vis-a-vis 
their Moslem brethren who, during Kraemer’s time (1926), made up roughly one- 
third and today constitute at least half of the Ambonese population. Yet, despite 
the large number of Moslems, the fiction remains in Indonesia and elsewhere that 
the Central Moluccas are Christian islands. Even among young, Dutch-born 
Moluccans, the impression prevails that Moslems constitute only a tiny minority in 
their home islands. These misconceptions are due to the fact that it was over­
whelmingly Christians who joined the Dutch colonial services outside the Moluccas 
and to the publicity Christian exiles received during their political actions. Only 
a tiny minority (an estimated 2 percent) of the exiles is Moslem and they have 
generally been politically passive. For an analysis of Ambon's Moslems, see 
Richard Chauvel, "Ambon’s Other Half: Some Preliminary Observations on Ambonese 
Moslem Society and History," Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs 14, 1 
(1980): 40-80.
7. After World War II, 25,000 Moluocan soldiers were in the service of the KNIL. 
With the transfer of sovereignty (1949), 12,000 of these were demobilized, 6,000 
were discharged, and 1,000 entered the Indonesian army (TNI). Circa 2,000 soldiers 
stationed in the South Moluccas became the core forces of the RMS army and 
about 4,000 others, stationed mainly on western islands, mostly on Java, refused 
to be demobilized or discharged anywhere but in the Moluccas or (then still) 
Dutch New Guinea (Gttnter Decker, Republik Maluku Selatan [GSttingen: Schwarz, 
1957], p. 31).
8. The islands claimed by the RMS are identical to those constituting the present-
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bubble burst too when the new Indonesian government imposed a blockade and its 
forces then attacked Ambon, defeating the "rebels" after a few months and only 
after vehement resistance. A guerrilla movement continued under the leadership 
of Dr. Christiaan Soumokil on the large island of Seram into the 1960s. 9
In the meantime, an overwhelming number of Moluocan KNIL soldiers sta­
tioned elsewhere in Indonesia, mostly on Java, fearing reprisals from the nation­
alists, refused either to be demobilized on Republican-controlled territory or to 
enter the TNI. Instead, they demanded that their discharge take place on Ambon 
or in western New Guinea (now Irian Jaya), then still under Dutch control. A 
stalemate developed when President Sukarno, suspecting that the soldiers would 
reinforce the RMS movement, refused to go along with this demand.
A delegation of KNIL soldiers went to the Netherlands and took their case to 
court. The judge agreed to their demands, and the Dutch government decided to 
bring the 4,000 soldiers plus around 8,500 family members "temporarily" to Holland 
in March and April of 1951.10 Most people expected that emotions would cool
day kabupaten Maluku Tengah and Maluku Tenggara, subdivisions of the province 
Maluku of the Republic of Indonesia.
9. This short summary of the events surrounding the declaration of the RMS is 
based on Ben vaan Kaam, The South Moluccans and Bung Penonton, De Zuidmolukse 
Republiek. A succinct account of post-World War II Moluocan history can be 
found in Richard Chauvel, "Ambon; Not a Revolution but a Counterrevolution," in 
Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution, ed. Audrey R. Kahin (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 1985), pp. 237-64.
Soumokil, a former minister of justice and attorney general of the federal 
State of East Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timur), was involved in the Andy Aziz 
coup in South Sulawesi and later was one of the chief figures behind the RMS. 
In 1952, he became president of the RMS emergency government on Seram. 
Arrested in 1963, he was condemned to death in 1964 but only executed in 1966 
by order of Suharto.
Manusama, who had left Seram on a political mission in 1952, arrived via New 
Guinea in the Netherlands in 1953. Having played at least as important a role in 
the RMS proclamation as Soumokil, he was of great symbolic value to the RMS 
movement in the Netherlands and became president of the RMS exile government 
after Soumokil's death.
10. 76.1 percent of the troops were ethnic Ambonese, i.e., people born in the 
Central Moluccas (65.5 percent) or born outside the Moluccas but of Ambonese 
origin. Most of the remaining 23.9 percent came from the southeastern Moluocan 
islands (e.g., Kei and Tanimbar). No breakdown for the total 12,500 people is 
available, although it is known that 93 percent of them were Protestant, ±4.5 
percent Roman Catholic (mostly from the southeastern Moluccas) and ±2.5 percent 
Moslems (largely ethnic Ambonese). A number of the soldiers* wives were of 
non-Moluccan origin (mostly Javanese), who generally had converted to the religion 
of their husbands. For more details, see Commissie Verwey-Jonker, Ambonezen in 
Nederland (The Hague: Staats-drukkerij- en Uitgevereijbedrijf, 1959).
In the beginning, all the newcomers were generically referred to as "Ambonese," 
a label resented by people from the Tenggara region who have had longstanding 
feuds with the Ambonese because of the latter's dominating and condescending 
attitude based on feelings of cultural superiority. Violent clashes between the 
two groups in the camp period prompted the Dutch government to place them in 
separate wards. Relationships have been improving in recent years among the
MOLUCCAN CAMPS AND 
WARDS IN THE NETHERLANDS
(as of November 1, 1965)
Explanations
woonoorden * camps
woonwijken = wards (circled
numbers)
Woonoorden f  A
1. W»jldemerck 18. Klein Baal
2 Ybenheer 19. Overbroek *  l'*
3 Marum 20. Lmgebrug l>rs k
4. Schattenberg 21. IJsseloord
5
6
7.
Geesbrug
Laarbrug
Conrad
22.
23
24.
Lunetten 
Genapium 
Oude Molen
De omlijnde cijfers 
geven de woonwijken a an:
8 Almfcre 25. Donzel 1. Appmgcdam 11. Wmterswijk
9 De Biezen 26. Vierlmgsbeek 2 Delfzijl 12 Cuyck
10 Ka zerne 27. Bterick 3 Hoogkerk 13. Geleen
11 Smgel 28. Tungelroy 4 Groningen 14. Heer
12. Utrechtse Straatweg29. Montfort 5 Marum 15. Nijverdol
13 Vaassen 30. Op de Loop 6 Oosterwoldc 16 Rijssen
14 Vossenbos 31. Rijckholt 7 Hoogezand 17 Zevenaar
15 G o iflm k s 3? Middelburg 8 Assen 18 Teuge
16 D e  H a a r 33. V lie g v e ld  S o u b u rg  9 Aim e to 19 Tiel
17 S n o d e n h o e k 34 V ln k w a te r 10 Deventer 20 L c o rd a m
21. Moordrecht
22. Krimpen aan de IJasel 
23 Waddinxveen
24. Wormerveer
25. Tilburg
26. Souburg
27. Middelburg
28. Koudekerke
29. Berneveld
30. Hoogeveen
31. Eerbcek
32 Doesburg
33 Opheusden
34. Elst
35. Breda
36 Breukelen
37. Hatert
38. Bemmel 
39 Helmond
40. Waalwijk
41. Zwolle
42 Apetdoorn
43 Luntercn
44 Culemborg
13 Alphcn o/d R«jn
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down within a few months and the Moluccans could then return safely to the 
Moluccas. This, of course, never happened.
Once having arrived in cold, damp Holland, the soldiers were rather uncere­
moniously discharged and put into camps spread all over the country—such as the 
former German concentration camps of Schattenberg and Vught. 11 This discharge, 
in the form of a mimeographed slip of paper, was the single biggest blunder the 
Dutch made and the primary source of all troubles to come in future years. The 
Moluccans felt sold out, treated like worthless trash. Even today, many feel that 
dogs would have been better rewarded for their loyalty. 12 Love and devotion 
were replaced by disappointment and embitterment. The proud soldiers felt emascu­
lated, quickly grabbing onto the RMS ideal to salvage meaning in their lives. 13
While living in the drafty, ramshackle camps, the dreams of an imminent 
return to their home islands could be maintained. However, starting in the early 
1960s, the Moluccans were moved, group after group, into newly built wijken, or 
wards, often located on what were then the outskirts of small- to middle-sized 
towns. The solid, drab, stone buildings symbolized permanence and a bleak future 
in a foreign country, an idea most Moluccans did not accept.
The older generation did not yet give up the belief that the Dutch govern­
ment would return them to a free Maluku in accordance with a promise they are 
convinced was made to them. 14 Moluccans view a promise (janji) as a very
young people, who do not share the bitter memories of their elders.
After some years, Moluccans began to refer to themselves as "South Moluccans," 
a term which is more inclusive and is also a political statement of a commitment 
to the RMS. The Dutch government has stopped using the term "Ambonese" but 
also rejected the designation "South Moluccans" because of its sensitivity vis-a-vis 
Indonesia. Instead, it has adopted, uniformly, the term "Moluccans."
11. See map for the geographical distribution of the former camps and most of 
the wards mentioned below. After this map was issued by the Dutch government, 
fifteen more wards were built. All thd camps were abolished, with the exception 
of camp Lunetten in Vught. Once the second largest camp with ca. 2,100 inhabi­
tants, the numbers there have dwindled to a few hundred who have held out 
mostly for political reasons. The planned dissolution of the camp in 1986 has 
created a lot of tension among Moluccans nationwide. Many would like to see at 
least part of it preserved as a historic monument.
12. Since most Moluccans who came to Holland never felt themselves to be 
Indonesian nationals, they never faced the question of whelhef'or not their role 
in colonial times was morally correct. Younger people do realize that their elders 
were tools of Dutch colonialism, but they almost entirely blame the Dutch.
13. The Dutch soon realized their mistake and tried to rectify the situation by 
offering the soldiers the opportunity to enlist in a civil guard in July 1952. The 
offer came too late. Nationalism ran high in the camps, and the Moluccans 
refused even to consider the proposal before some political concessions regarding 
the RMS were made, and they eventually rejected it altogether (van Kaam, South 
Moluccans, p. 138).
14. The Dutch authorities insist that such a promise was never made. It is, 
however, conceivable that Dutch officials in Indonesia made statements to that 
effect to assure a smooth transfer of the KNIL troops to Holland. Whatever may 
be the truth, older Moluccans firmly believe that such a promise exists.
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serious undertaking, making the person who gives it subject to supernatural 
punishment if his promises are not kept, so they continued to believe the one 
given by the Dutch would eventually be fulfilled.
The Uoluccan Community Prior to the Hijackings
Life in the camps, and also perhaps during the early years of the wards, was 
extremely public. In the camps, only paper-thin walls separated the families from 
one another, and doors were never locked. People would go in and out of each 
other’ s cramped living quarters without ever knocking on the door.
Hospitality was a matter of course and so was mutual help whenever needed. 
The Moluccans call this masohi. In Java it is known as gotong-royong. Virtually 
everyone was invited to the numerous baptisms, confirmations, weddings, and, of 
course, funerals, which traditionally have the function of creating unity in an 
often divisive society. Thus, large feasts were common, but so were large-scale 
fights—both apparently enjoyed with the same relish. Despite the spartan, harsh 
living conditions, life in the camps was ramai, filled with fun. In a way, it was 
little different from their former life in the military barracks (tangsi) back in 
Indonesia. It should come as no surprise that in such a situation of open living, 
social control was very strong, and at times oppressive. Individuals had very 
little room for personal freedom. All had to conform to established, rigorously 
enforced rules and norms of adat (customary laws and traditions) and the military 
code of behavior. 15
Adat was strictly adhered to. Probably more so in the diaspora than back in 
Indonesia. But it was mostly adat-by-rote, i.e., people followed, and forced their 
children to follow, customs and rules of whose underlying philosophy the ex­
soldiers knew little. Most of them had left their home village (negeri) in their 
teens and twenties, too young to be fully initiated, let alone interested, in the 
refinements of their own culture. About one-tenth of them had been born outside 
the Moluccas and so knew even less.
Thus, in many instances, adat had to be reconstructed, piece by piece, from 
the little everyone remembered. The resulting end product sometimes differed 
from one to the other region in Holland and was occasionally quite different from 
the way a certain custom was, and is, handled in the Moluccas.
15. In numerous interviews Moluccans, both old and young, described camp life 
with a mix of bittersweet exuberance and sentimentality. They remember political 
infighting, the bullying by some ex-sergeants, the intense pressure to conform, 
but when they add up the negative and positive aspects in their memories softened 
by the passing years, the good times outweigh the bad. The camp, like the 
tangsi, seems some Paradise Lost, a period of intense community feeling sorely 
missed and never to be recovered. From the beginning, however, there were 
many who left the camps for reasons of personal ambition or because of conflicts 
with others and, as time went on, quite a few were forced out for political 
reasons, as we will see below. For an eyewitness description of the situation in 
the camps in the first period, see Tamme Wittermans, "Social Organization of 
Ambonese Refugees in Holland" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of London, 1976), 
pp. 22-66 and passim. A close-up description of the situation in three small 
camps in one small town (Woerden, South Holland) is given by Nico van Wijk, 
Ambon of Belanda? (Leiden: COMT, 1985).
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One such example is pela, an intervillage alliance system based on mutual 
help. In the Central Moluccas intermarriage between members of the allied 
villages is, with few exceptions, strictly forbidden; a person’s village affiliation 
which determines with whom a person is wpela,n is reckoned patrilineally. 16 In 
the Netherlands, however, Moluccans trace village affiliation bilaterally. This 
means that young men or women must count not only the pela of their father, 
but also that of their mother and, by extension, of their grandparents on both 
sides, and so on-going back anywhere from three to seven generations. Thus, 
while someone in the Moluccas must take account of only a small fixed number of 
pela, a Moluccan in Holland can end up with a very large and ever increasing 
number of pela, limiting his or her marriage choice considerably. Within a few 
generations, everyone will be pela with everyone else and Moluccans will have to 
marry exogamously (i.e., with partners from other ethnic groups), if they don’t 
return to the original rules or otherwise alter them.
Up to the mid-1970s, it can be said that, in general, adat and the Moluccan 
lifestyle as such were accepted as given and only of secondary importance. What 
dominated collective thought was the RMS ideology. For the group there was 
only one primary goal: the return to an independent state in the Moluccas. 17 
However, almost from the start Moluccans could not agree on a common strategy 
for achieving this goal. Numerous movements rose and disappeared, with their 
leaders frequently gaining followers more on the basis of traditional family, 
village, pela, and island loyalties than by the appeal of particular ideologies. 
There were various attempts at unification. In December 1962 several factions 
decided to create a federation called Badan Persekutuan (BP), and when this failed 
the various groups within BP were dissolved in June 1966 to form a new unitary 
front called Badan Persatuan Rajat Maluku Selatan (BPRMS). At this same meeting, 
formation of the Pemerintah Darurat ("Emergency Government") was announced, 
with J. S. Manusama as president. The exile government was promised the backing 
of the BPRMS, which could claim support from a majority of Moluccans in the 
Netherlands. 18
This did not end factionalist strife. Another challenge was mounted in 1968 
when a charismatic and colorful ex-KNIL sergeant, I. J. Tamaela, founded a move­
ment popularly known as "Missie Militer" (later changed to Front Siwa Lima), and 
the following year declared himself president of a counter-government. Charging 
Manusama with having failed to further the RMS cause, especially in the interna­
tional arena, Tamaela did not bother to deal with Dutch authorities but concen­
trated on the United Nations, setting himself up in the United States. His major
16. For a full account of the pela village alliance system, see Dieter Bartels, 
"Guarding the Invisible Mountain" (Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1977).
17. In the earliest years the establishment of a Moluccan Protestant Church 
(Geredja Indjil Maluku), independent of the Dutch Reformed Church whose beliefs 
are shared by Moluccans, also played an important role. This church was always 
closely tied to the RMS struggle.
18. The chairman of the Badan Persekutuan was Dominee S. Metiary, a former 
army chaplain. He was also elected chairman of the BPRMS, a function he still 
holds. It seems that Metiary is the most important power broker in the organi­
zation, while Manusama, one of the original engineers of the RMS in Ambon and 
thus a symbol of the struggle, has been able to remain aloof from internal strife. 
For details on the foundation of the PB and BPRMS, see Penonton, Zuidmolukse 
Republiek, pp. 143-47 and 153-54.
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coup was when he gained recognition for his movement from the African state of 
Benin (formerly Dahomey), offering new hope to many Moluocans who likewise 
were disillusioned by the stagnation of the RMS struggle. Violent clashes broke 
out in many Moluccan communities between the followers of Manusama and Tamaela 
in the first years of the "Missie" movement. The movement lost much of its 
impetus in the seventies and has shown little activity since the death of its 
prophet in Benin in 1978, but many of its original followers still bear the mental 
scars of the fierce persecutions they suffered from the Manusama forces and 
retain their hostility toward that group.
As can be seen, much energy has been spent in bitter internal struggles 
between RMS’ers and those suspected of disloyalty, as well as between the various 
factions and splinter groups supporting the RMS. It was in connection with these 
struggles that social control was most oppressive. Deviants were often threatened 
with death, physical harm, or branded as traitors and ostracized. Inside the 
camps and wards, opposition was not tolerated.
During this all-encompassing struggle for and within the RMS, the various 
leaders largely neglected either to prepare their people for an eventual return to 
their homeland or to cope with life in Holland, even if only temporarily. Until 
the hijacking period, there was hardly any discussion about the viability of adat, 
about adjusting to the Dutch situation, or about taking advantage of educational 
and economical opportunities which might be useful in either Holland or the 
Moluccas. Instead, there was only one single vision and one single-minded pursuit 
which was acceptable—that of the RMS.
And during these years there was very little economic progress. Moluocans 
initially did find employment in the postwar boom period of the early 1950s but 
mostly as unskilled or semiskilled laborers in factories or shipyards. Their children, 
usually having a poor command of Dutch, were, more often than not, funneled 
into technical schools (boys) and home economics schools (girls). Career choices 
were largely left to the often paternalistic Dutch teachers, partly because the 
parents could not communicate with the school officials and partly because the 
traditional idea still prevailed that "guru" (teachers) have elevated status and 
their decisions must not be questioned. There were, of course, exceptions, but 
only around 1970 did a small number of young Moluocans begin to enter universi­
ties.
Economic and social advance was further hindered by the physical and psych­
ological isolation of the Moluocans in their camps and wards. Almost all of the 
camps were located outside small towns and cities. Most of the new wards built 
especially for Moluocans were also situated on what were then the edges of 
towns, usually as self-contained compounds physically separating Dutch and Moluc­
can inhabitants. But isolation was also self-imposed. Contacts with the Dutch 
were shunned. After work or school, Moluocans would retreat into the security 
of their living quarters where all their social life took place. Increasingly, they 
were left stranded at the margins of society, and, gradually, the other ethnic 
minorities, all but one of which arrived much later in the Netherlands, passed 
them in terms of economic advancement and generally in their functional integra­
tion into Dutch society.
To summarize, prior to the unrest of the late 1960s and the subsequent 
hijackings, the Moluccan community was culturally at a standstill, stymied in its 
development towards emancipation and economic advancement. Rigid clinging to 
the RMS ideology was largely responsible for the apparent stagnation. Neverthe­
less, under the surface crucial changes were occurring which, in the long run 
would radically alter the self-image and identity of Moluccans, as well as the
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social web of the community. Many of these creeping social changes were intensi­
fied and became more visible after the hijackings and therefore will be discussed 
in this context below.
At the time of the hijackings the Moluccan population in Holland had tripled 
to an estimated 35-40,000 people. These figures include a few thousand Moluocans 
who were either former members of the Dutch Navy or Moluocans who had been 
working for the Dutch in New Guinea and had chosen to come to Holland in 
1962—the year western New Guinea (West Irian) was transferred to Indonesia. 19 
The rest of the increase was due to a population explosion among the former 
KNIL exiles, who still placed a strong cultural value on large families and had 
virtually no knowledge about prevention methods.
The Hijackings and Their Aftermath
During the mid-1960s, segments of Moluccan youth became increasingly restless. 
This restlessness must be seen in the context of the international youth revolts, 
the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, the general antiestablishment feelings, and 
the various liberation movements, 20 particularly, the Black Power movement in the 
United States. The Black Panthers made an especially strong impression, not only 
ideologically, but also on the young Moluocans* dress and hairstyles. Despite 
these outside influences the roots of unrest must be sought within the Moluccan 
community.
One internal source for the ferment may have been the sudden transition 
from the sheltered, self-contained life in the camps to much more impersonal 
housing developments next to the Dutch. Moreover, people from the large camps 
were dispersed among several, sometimes distant, housing projects which separated 
relatives and disrupted friendships. Children from the large camps who had been 
going to Moluccan schools now suddenly found themselves a minority in Dutch 
schools, ill-equipped to follow the curriculum and to interact with their Dutch 
peers. 21
In the midst of the new upheaval and uncertainty, the youths saw the futile 
bickering among the leaders and the total lack of progress in the RMS struggle. 
Their parents still felt the shock of their traumatic arrival, a trauma that had 
been magnified as, year after year, their hopes of return became dimmer and
19. Both these groups are financially much better off than the KNIL group. The 
Navy members have relatively high pensions, and the generally better-educated 
people from New Guinea found good paying jobs with relative ease. Large numbers 
of both groups sympathized with the RMS, but were rejected by the KNIL group 
as being not truly Moluccan. There are concentrations of one or other group in 
some cities, but they all live spread out rather than in wards.
20. The unrest and the spread of ideologies was facilitated, unwittingly, by the 
Dutch railways, which issued a very inexpensive youth ticket which allowed its 
holders to travel anywhere in Holland for a week. This made it possible, for the 
first time, for Moluccan youth to meet in large numbers at rock concerts or by 
visiting each other's wards.
21. The youths involved in the hijackings grew up in Camp Schattenberg, a 
totally self-contained camp located in an isolated woody region in Drenthe Province, 
miles away from the surrounding villages.
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dimmer. The young watched the older generation suffer, increasingly more disillu­
sioned and ever more disappointed over what seemed to them the treason committed 
by the Dutch. The old soldiers and their wives felt disappointment, not hatred. 
Even today, listening to them relate their autobiographies, I rarely find hatred— 
only despair and tears of disappointment rolling down their cheeks.
Hatred, without doubt, burned in the hearts of many of their sons and daugh­
ters, who were angered at their parents* treatment at the hands of the Dutch. 
The young people felt it was their responsibility to restore their parents’ honor, 
if not to avenge them. Yet, most felt equally powerless and hopeless. They, too, 
dreamed of the paradisiacal islands far away, described to them in tropical lushness 
by their parents while, simultaneously, they were being attracted to the luxuries 
of Western life. They were caught, betwixt and between, belonging neither here 
nor there.
Much less patient than their parents, and with a great deal less trust in the 
honorable intentions of the Dutch government or the effectiveness of their own 
leadership, feeling alienated, uprooted, and powerless, Moluocan youths became 
increasingly radicalized. Observing the success of liberation and antiestablishment 
movements, they began to adopt the same patterns of dissent and violence, esca­
lating their methods as did terrorist groups elsewhere, to force both the Nether­
lands and Indonesia to listen to their demands for the establishment of a free 
RMS. The first major action occurred on the nights of July 26 and 27, 1966. In 
retribution for the execution of RMS President Soumokil, militant youths set light 
to the Indonesian Embassy in The Hague.
Another act of violence occurred a few years later on August 31, 1970, when 
Moluccan youths occupied the Indonesian Embassy on the eve of President Suharto’s 
visit to the Netherlands—the first visit by an Indonesian Head-of-State to the 
country of the former colonizers. In the wake of this so-called "Wassenaar 
Incident” (Peristiwa Wassenaar), one Dutch policeman was left dead. 22
The next incidents occurred in 1975. Vietnam had defeated and expelled the 
US forces and the PLO terrorists had been staging spectacular hijackings and 
kidnappings. A plan to kidnap Queen Juliana was foiled in the spring of that 
year. But in December, young Moluccan extremists hijacked a train near Assen 
(in the northern part of Holland) where the largest concentration of Moluoeans is 
settled. Only two days later, another group seized the Indonesian consulate in 
Amsterdam. Four people died before the two groups surrendered to the authori­
ties. Two years later, Moluccans again made headlines in the world press. In 
May 1977, two different groups (again from the north) occupied an elementary 
school and hijacked yet another train, taking a total of 105 children and 59 
adults hostage. Twenty days later, Dutch troops recaptured the train and school. 
Six terrorists and two hostages were dead. 2a
The four train hijackings and hostage-taking actions in 1975 and 1977 were 
the desperate deeds of small groups of young people—a total of twenty^six men
22. For a personal account of the "Wassenaar Incident" by one of the protagonists, 
see Tete Siahaya, Wassenaar '70: Zuid Molukkers slaan terug (Amsterdam: De 
Dezige Bij, 1972).
23. The actions in 1975 and 1977 are recorded in Ralph Barker, Not Here, But in 
Another Place, A True Story of Captors and Hostages (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1980). See also A. P. Schmid and J. de Graaf, Insurgent Terrorism and the 
Western News Media (Leiden: COMT, 1980), pp. 262-315.
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and one woman—who had simply reached the end of the line in their despair. 
They were friends who acted more or less spontaneously, not conspirators with 
long-term goals, and they had no apparent connections to international terrorist 
organizations. While they captured the front page headlines of the world press 
and sent shockwaves throughout Holland, they did not stand alone. Rather they 
dared to put into action what many other young Moluocans felt at the time.
Quite predictably, the actions were a complete failure as far as attaining 
their political goals is concerned. Also quite predictably, the actions did not gain 
sympathy for the Moluccan cause but rather triggered a considerable backlash 
among the Dutch population, aggravating rather than alleviating the position of 
the Moluccans in Holland. 24
The actions did, however, have the result that the Dutch government began 
to pay a lot more attention to the Moluccans than previously. Money was lavishly 
spent on projects benefiting Moluccans, and a Moluccan Advisory Council25 was 
created which is supposed to have some input in governmental decisions concerning 
Moluccans. Perhaps the Dutch were able to buy time, but the political problem 
remained unsolved.
The actions also had the effect of drawing the Moluccan community in Holland 
closer together than ever before. This happened in two ways. On one hand, 
widespread abuse by Dutch civilians and indiscriminate actions by the police 
against younger Moluccans (including non-involved Southeast Moluccans and 
Ambonese Moslems) -countrywide, made those Moluccans living outside the wards 
and better integrated into the Dutch system suddenly aware of their vulnerability 
as a racial minority. Those who had long ago left the wards all felt a new and 
greater solidarity with those inside them, with many returning to the wards or 
deciding to settle close to them, where they felt more secure.
On the other hand, while most Moluccans did not condone the violence, they 
did accept collective guilt, and with it, felt a deep appreciation for the sacrifice
24. The immediate repercussions ranged from Dutch civilians cursing Moluocans 
on the streets to police harassing young Moluccans or anybody who faintly resembled 
them, including many Dutch-Indonesians. A more long-term effect resulted from 
stereotyping Moluccans as violence-prone, leading to widespread discrimination, 
particularly on the labor market. For an analysis of the positive and negative 
effects of the actions on the Moluccan community and on Dutch society, see 
Andr€ Kdbben, "De gijzelingsakties van Zuikmolukkers en hun effekten op do 
samenleving," Transaktie 8, 2 (1979): 147-54. Professor KObben concludes that the 
overall effects were negative but admits that this statement is a value judgment. 
I agree with him that in the short run (the article was written only two years 
after the last actions) the effects were indeed detrimental, but I also believe 
strongly, based on the post-hijacking developments outlined on the following 
pages, that, in the long run, the positive effects will outweigh the negative. May 
this also stand as a "value judgment."
25. Inspraakorgaan Welzijn Molukkers (IWM). Although members of the IWM 
frequently complain that the government often makes decisions concerning Moluocans 
without waiting for their advice, the organization has been quite successful as a 
watchdog agency and able to generate sufficient pressure to make the government 
modify or back off from policy decisions considered detrimental to Moluccan interests.
The success of the IWM may be one of the reasons behind recent attempts by 
the Dutch government to abolish it and create an advisory board for all minorities, 
in which, based on numerical considerations alone, Moluccans would have much 
less power.
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the youngsters had made for their people (bangsa). The community, usually split 
into innumerable factions based on social divisions and regional affiliations, as 
well as religious and political groupings, became unified at the funeral of the 
hijackers who had been killed by the Dutch troops in retaking the train in the 
1977 hijacking. The funeral was attended by 17,000 mourners. If the hijackers’ 
intention was to revive a Moluocan consciousness, they certainly succeeded, and 
this heightened awareness of being Moluccan has continued until today.
But these dramatic events had other unintended outcomes which, in my judg­
ment, were much more crucial, because of their implications for the future develop­
ment of the Moluccan community in Holland—outcomes which are, ironically, in 
many ways contrary to the young idealists' aims. I want to emphasize that I do 
not see the hijackings as the direct cause of these developments and again stress 
that some of them had already begun before. Rather, I see the hijackings as a 
catharsis (and a catalyst) in the sense that they had a purging effect which 
forced Moluccans to look at themselves and their ideals and to reevaluate their 
position in the Netherlands.
Before describing these effects, a few words should be said about other 
immigrant groups who now make their home in the Netherlands. The Dutch- 
Indonesian people born in Indonesia of Eurasian origin who arrived at about the 
same time as the Moluccans, integrated with such speed into Dutch society that 
the authorities like to present them as their "show case" of successful adaptation; 
so successful indeed that the government no longer even considers them a minor­
ity. 88 Successive waves of immigrants from Surinam, the Netherlands-Antilles, 
and the Mediterranean regions all came to the Netherlands voluntarily and, while 
facing problems of culture shock and discrimination, made conscious efforts to 
integrate at least structurally. 27 This is even true to some extent for those 
segments of the Moluccan community in the Netherlands who are not part of the 
KNIL contingent.
The KNIL Moluccans have faced some, if not most, of the problems encountered 
by the above groups and have employed, or perhaps will be employing in the 
future, similar or identical strategies to find solutions. What makes the case of 
the KNIL Moluccans unique is that they have been the only ethnic minority which 
steadfastly claimed to be in Holland against their will and stubbornly resisted, as 
a group, even structural integration-let alone psychological integration, i.e., 
voluntary assimilation. The main differences between them and other immigrant 
groups, therefore, lay not so much in the types of problems or strategies but in 
the divergent processes of adaptation themselves.
The hijackings clearly shocked many Moluccans into a realization of the 
hopelessness of attaining the RMS and the small prospect of a collective return to 
the Moluccas in the near future. More or less consciously, they had probably 
been aware much earlier that they might have to stay in Holland for a long 
period of time, or perhaps permanently. However, any person who voiced such
26. They are, for example, deleted in a report to the government by the Nether­
lands Scientific Council for Government Policy (Rinus Penninx, Ethnic Minorities 
[The Hague: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid, 1979]). In recent 
years, however, there seems to be a growing ethnic consciousness developing 
among young Indonesian-Dutch which could create unexpected problems for the 
Dutch government. The "assimilation process" of the Indonesian-Dutch is described 
by Hans van Amersfoort, Immigration and Formation of Minority Groups (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 81-96.
27. Their social position is outlined in Penninx, Ethnic Minorities, pp. 47-151.
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thoughts would inevitably be labeled a "traitor." Now, it is possible to discuss 
not only the chances of permanent stay in the Netherlands but even the political 
and social problems a mass return would create.
For the first time, Moluccans are considering the possibility of rejection by 
the people back home, who would not only lose their regular subsidiary income in 
form of money sent from their relations in Holland but also would have to share 
already scarce resources, particularly land. Young Moluccans also worry aloud 
that their life styles are radically different, and that the people living in the 
islands would resent any attempts to have "Western ways" of doing things forced 
upon them, and certainly would resist being bossed around in the political arena.
It has also become an open topic for discussion whether or not they could 
adjust to life in the Moluccas. While many still emphatically claim that they can 
easily forsake Western luxury and keep themselves busy with working to develop 
their homeland, others are not so sure that they could even adjust to the sanitary 
conditions there. It has become possible now to state openly one’s decision not 
to return to the Moluccas, even in the event of the realization of the RMS. This 
breaking of the taboo against discussing these issues publicly has been leading to 
an acceleration in the speed of change but also to a greater control over the 
direction this change—-or changes—will take.
One decisive change has occurred in the political sphere. The RMS ideal, 
still strong among the older people who are slowly dying away, has been put on 
the back burner by many in the middle generation (ca. 25-45 years of age) and is 
definitely secondary for most of the youngest generation. Individual happiness 
and well-being, here and now, are considered of first importance. It is certainly 
too early to write the obituary for the RMS but, for the moment, it has lost 
much of its glamor. In Bovensmilde, home of the hijackers and former RMS 
bastion, young leaders now openly state that the prosperity of Moluccans in 
Holland must be their first concern.
One incident, occurring on the sidelines during the actions, might have con­
tributed as much to the decline of the RMS ideal, as the failure of the actions by 
itself. It was a statement by RMS President Manusama in which he disowned the 
hijackers "as being his children." as The peers of the hijackers, and many other 
Moluccans, never forgave him—not for condemning the actions, but for failing to 
take responsibility for all his people, even if they were wrong. The result has 
been a considerable loss of prestige and respect not only for Manusama himself, 
but also for the RMS political organization, the Badan Persatuan. Then, and now, 
the BP dominates many of the ward councils. But its leaders have since lost 
much of their previous control over the people, a development which, in turn, has 
facilitated the growth of greater individual freedom in the wards.
Identity Search and Westernization
The issue most directly confronting the Moluccans in the wake of the hijack­
ings was that of identity: "Who are we Moluccans? What constitutes Moluoean- 
ness? What is our position in Holland?"
These became the central questions, initiating a sometimes painful reevalua­
tion of the Moluccan society in Holland, its relationship to the Moluccas and to
28. Some Moluccans argue that the hijackings were as much directed against 
Manusama and the Badan Persatuan as against the Dutch government.
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the colonial past. The search for identity has touched almost every aspect of 
Molucean culture and society, including history, adat, language, education, family 
and social relationships, and religion. Of course, there were, and are, no single 
approaches and solutions. Different persons and groups tried to follow different 
roads. But, I believe some general trends can be discerned which I want to 
discuss below. As we will see, some of the developments pull towards separatism, 
while others push towards greater integration into Dutch society. In this sense 
Moluccans are still betwixt and between.
History and Adat
There has been a great interest in historical and anthropological works on the 
Moluccas. Everything written on Moluccans is indiscriminately bought, or photo­
copied, and collected. This reading has led to an awareness of colonial history, 
especially about the not-always-praiseworthy activities of the Dutch. The former 
"comrades-in-arms" are now often vilified, but the peculiar role Moluccans played 
during the colonial period is still largely skirted. Ethnographies are used to 
create myths about the precolonial, unspoiled Molucean, a kind of noble savage, 
the "Alifuru." 29 This quest for one’s roots creates not only ethnic pride; there is 
also the danger that the newly acquired knowledge about the past will help 
increase the already strong anti-Dutch feelings.
Adat as practiced by the Moluccans in Holland has also come under close 
scrutiny. The young people are no longer satisfied when their parents tell them 
that they have to follow a certain custom because it is adat, or because it always 
has been done that way. They want to know its origin and its function and have 
become quite critical of certain customs and folkways. More and more, traditional 
adat loses its function as an all-encompassing way of life. Rather, it becomes a 
convenient identity marker vis-S-vis the Dutch.
Even the earlier-mentioned pela alliances have come under attack, despite 
pela’s almost sacred status as the most uniquely Molucean institution. The youth 
find the many marriage restrictions a nuisance, especially since their elders have 
been unable to explain the meaning of pela to them in a way that justifies in 
their eyes making sacrifices for it.
Yet, at the same time as the search and research of adat has intensified, and 
as many youngsters are also visiting the Moluccas to find their roots, there has 
been developing a growing social distance vis-a-vis their "home villages" in the 
Moluccas, which once were the central reference points in terms of identity. 30 
For example, at meetings of village associations, the so-called kumpulan, 31 more
29. "Alifuru" is the collective term for the inland tribes of Seram. During colonial 
times the term also connoted "savage"--in the negative sense of the word. The 
Alifuru was despised not only by the Dutch but by the population of Ambon- 
Lease as well. The symbolic reversal from negative to positive has, independently, 
also occurred in the Central Moluccas.
30. Regardless of where Moluccans are born, they almost always refer to the 
village of clan origin as the "home." Only recently have young Moluccans in 
Holland stopped this convention, referring first to the Dutch towns in which their 
ward is located.
31. A kumpulan is an organization of people from a certain village or island. 
The purpose is to hold the group together, uphold adat, help with projects of the
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and more young people complain about the large amounts of money collected and 
sent to the home village to finance various projects, claiming that the money 
could be put to better use by supporting youth activities of the village organiza­
tion in Holland.
Language and Education
The issue of language is central for the Moluocans. When they arrived in 
Holland most of them spoke Ambon-Malay, a regional variant of Malay enriched in 
the tangsi with words and expressions derived from Indonesian and Javanese. In 
contrast to what has occurred in the Moluccas themselves, where the modern 
vocabulary of Ambon-Malay has been expanding by the incorporation of Indonesian 
terms, the soldiers’ version spoken in Holland remained relatively static. Since 
Indonesian terms were rejected for political reasons, vocabulary gaps have been 
partially filled by Dutch loanwords. In this form Ambonese Malay has continued 
to be used as the preferred means of communication among the Indonesian-born 
older generation of Moluccans. The younger generations, especially the first 
Dutch-born generation, being exposed to Malay at home and Dutch at school or 
work, developed their own creole, a seemingly random mix of Malay and Dutch, 
referred to as "Malayu Sini." Largely incomprehensible to the older generation, 
this "pidgin" created a communications gap between the generations. It has also 
had the effect of crippling the younger people’s knowledge of Dutch, severely 
hampering their educational advancement and their employment chances.
Young parents now are more conscious about the future of their children and 
are making efforts to have them learn good Dutch at the expense of Malay. 
Some even go so far as to send their children not to the neighborhood schools 
traditionally attended by Moluccan children, but to all-Dutch schools. This means, 
in some cases, choosing schools without religious affiliation (openbare scholen) 
rather than the Protestant schools traditionally preferred by the strongly religious 
Moluccans. This is done to prevent the children from speaking Malay with their 
agemates and also to prevent peer pressure in the choice of a secondary educa­
tion, thus trying to break the traditional pattern of children choosing to go to 
schools selected by most of their friends—which often means trade schools instead 
of high schools. 32
A reverse trend can be detected among the children of those Moluccans who 
left the camps early on their own initiative, determined to succeed in Dutch 
society or, at least, give their offspring the best possible head start. In their 
families, Dutch was spoken exclusively at home to assure that children would be 
fluent in this language. 33 This was true also for youngsters from the New Guinea
home village, and contribute labor and money for funerals of members. They 
usually have one general meeting a year and also stage dancing events, sport 
tournaments, lotteries, etc.
32. The number of youths entering universities is still very low and the numbers 
of graduates even lower. Consistent with the ongoing identity search, "Indonesian 
Studies" has become a popular field. More young people have been seeking degrees 
in the field of "Social Work" in their stated desire to work for the progress of 
"their own people." Programs in this field are taught in the Netherlands in 
special schools, the so-called Social Academies CSociaale Academies).
33. Compared with Americans, the Dutch are much more language-conscious, and
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and Navy groups whose generally better-educated parents either have a good 
command of Dutch or even have Dutch as their first language. Before the hijack­
ings, all these youngsters had little or no contact with KNIL-Moluccans, but the 
actions (and the resulting discrimination by the Dutch) have raised their con­
sciousness of being Moluccan and have drawn them closer to the KNIL groups 
where they have found increasing acceptance by their peers.
Among them in recent years, there has been a conscious attempt to save 
Ambonese Malay and to have it taught in the schools. A small but growing 
minority even pleads for Indonesian as the language to be taught. Some young­
sters who grew up outside the wards are now angry at their parents’ decision to 
speak only Dutch at home to assure that their children would learn proper Dutch 
and thus succeed in Holland. Quite a few of these young people have learned, or 
are trying to learn, Malay on their own~which is their passport into the larger 
Moluccan community where they seek to belong and become fully accepted.
Family and Social Interaction
As far as the family itself is concerned, there have been changes too over 
the past thirty years. One which occurred rather quietly was the drastic reduction 
in the size of the Moluccan family. The Indonesian-born group valued large 
families, and ten or more children were common. In contrast, the Dutch-born 
families average only two to three children—just as their Dutch counterparts. 
One result of the smaller family size has been the stabilization of the size of the 
Moluccan community.
There has been a steadily increasing number of intermarriages with the Dutch. 
Among the small educated elite of the first generation (only a handful of whom, 
incidentally, ever lived in camps or wards), marrying a Dutch woman was fairly 
common, perhaps also because it was a sign of status. A few of the unmarried 
soldiers who arrived in Holland in 1951 also chose Dutch wives—partially at least 
because there were insufficient Moluccan women~but most of them were able to 
find Moluccan wives often from among the daughters of their older comrades. 34
Among the Dutch-born Moluccans, however, intermarriage with the Dutch has 
become almost customary, not only among men, but also equally among women. In 
the beginning, with their older children, first generation parents put up a strong 
resistance, but they lost the battle. Nowadays, in some communities, the rate of 
intermarriage is as high as 60 percent. Even in the most conservative wards I
social class and social mobility are more closely linked to a person’s proper 
command of the language.
34. Hilde Verwey-Jonker was the chairperson of a commission conducting a compre­
hensive study of the situation of Moluccans in the late 1950s, resulting in a now 
classic report, Ambonezen in Nederland. In a recent interview in Marinjo (March 
1985), Verwey-Jonker expressed her surprise at the relatively low occurrence of 
mixed marriages in light of the large number of bachelors (over 1,000) among the 
KNIL troops and the shortage of single women. Since actual figures are unavailable, 
it is difficult to ascertain both how great the shortage of women was and how 
large a percentage of the bachelors married non-Moluccans. I believe that the 
shortage was actually not very great since the daughters of many of the older 
soldiers reached a marriageable age within their first two or three years in 
Holland. There was probably little competition from adult sons, since Moluccan 
men tend to marry late.
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would estimate that at least one-third of the youths marry Dutch partners. 35 in 
most cases this involves the Dutch partner being drawn into the Moluccan commun­
ity, rather than the Moluccan becoming more integrated into Dutch society. 
Attracted by the coziness and tightness of the Moluccan family, the Dutch partners 
often act more Moluccan than their spouses. They frequently learn Malay, dress 
according to adat at festivities, follow Moluccan etiquette, become engulfed in the 
family network, and, in quite a few cases I studied, are more knowledgeable about 
Moluccan history and culture than their Moluccan family. One can even observe 
Dutch women accusing the Moluccan sisters-in-law of being less Moluccan than 
they are, or admonishing them to act more Moluccan!
For Moluccans, marriage with a Dutch partner represents getting the best of 
two worlds, being able to continue their participation in Moluccan social life 
while, at least within their own partnership, not being restricted by traditional 
conventions and role models and being allowed to live a freer Western-style life. 
While Moluccan in-laws (including the partner's brothers and sisters) would have 
expected frequent visits and demanded various favors, cordial relationships and 
infrequent visits may suffice with Dutch in-laws. Moluccan men also find marrying 
a Dutch girl attractive because she is often more willing to enter the more tradi­
tional role of "submissive" wife and homemaker than are modern Moluccan girls. 
Dutch wives also seem less concerned about the husbands' fiscal responsibility, 
career chances, and economic obligations. On the other side, Moluccan girls state 
that they prefer Dutch men because they accept women more readily as equal 
partners, are more open-minded, have broader interests, and are less promiscuous 
and economically more responsible.
There have been changes too in the field of child rearing. The Indonesian- 
born generation brought up their children with strict, sometimes harsh discipline. 
The "victims" of this upbringing often explain, laughingly and not without apprecia­
tion, that they were raised "military style." The parents' authority was unques­
tioned, with orders never explained and a child never allowed to ask for a reason. 
Any transgressions of the rules were severely, often corporally, punished. Despite 
apparently appreciating the strict upbringing they received, these very people 
have almost totally broken the pattern with their own children. They raise them 
with great permissiveness and gentleness, following more the Dutch style of child 
raising but without permitting its anarchy.
Hitting a child has become a rarity. If corporal punishment is inflicted, it is 
usually not in anger but after giving the child an explanation. Children are 
allowed to voice their own opinions; house rules and punishments are discussed 
and, generally, a child is allowed much more privacy and personal space. To be 
sure, some "Moluccan traits" are being instilled, for example filial piety, respect 
for older people, and family allegiance, but even these are enforced less strictly. 
Again, radical changes are inherent in this development.
In recent years, too, the traditional hierarchical system among siblings, in 
which older children can order younger ones around and in which the oldest 
brother, the bung, plays the authoritative role of surrogate father, is being seriously 
challenged by the younger Dutch-born siblings of both sexes.
35. One has also to raise the question of whether or not the high rate of Dutch 
intermarriage not only with Moluccans, but also with Dutch-Indonesians and to a 
lesser degree with other ethnic minorities, is not really a Dutch phenomenon. 
Whatever the case, intermarriage requires acceptance from both sides and, quite 
obviously, the Moluccans have demonstrated their willingness.
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The extreme closeness of the family is still intact, as is the long dependency 
of children on the parents. But as people insist on ever greater privacy and 
individual freedom, the family structure will also loosen. Of course, the whole 
family structure as it is known today will disappear in the next generation, 
because of the smallness of the young families and the egalitarian upbringing of 
the children.
For the first time, old age has become a problem within the Moluocan commun­
ity. Traditionally, one son, daughter, or grandchild was designated to stay home 
and take care of the parents when they became old and frail. This is still the 
custom in a majority of Moluocan families. However, there are a slowly increasing 
number of cases where parents, especially a widow or widower, are moved into an 
old-age home. This is still a highly emotional issue, and attempts are being made 
to find a "Moluccan solution," i.e., to build special housing for the elderly within, 
or in the vicinity, of the wards. More than anything else, this development 
shows that the traditional family system is falling apart and is being replaced by 
a more Western structure.
Although intermarriage with the Dutch is now widely accepted, intermarriage 
with other ethnic or racial groups is not. These groups, including Dutch Indone­
sians, are considered to be of lower social status. 36 perhaps surprisingly, the 
problem of the children of mixed marriages being "half-bloods" 37 has not yet 
become a topic of debate in the Moluccan community. Most are being raised as 
Moluccans but it remains to be seen where they will fit in when they reach 
adulthood.
Individualization
Individual choice and decision making is being more and more stressed by 
young people, although many Moluccans still proudly point to their collective ways 
of thinking and acting. Aside from the fact that traditional built-in conflict in 
Moluccan society between community conformity and individual expression still 
exists, the trend towards individualization has become very strong and irrever­
sible.
The first step occurred when people moved from the camps to the wards. In 
the wards, they still lived in close physical proximity but the change in architec­
tural design led to greater social distance. The "long-house syndrome" of the 
camps was being replaced by the "my home is my castle" philosophy which fitted 
the change in architecture from barracks to separate self-contained units. In the 
new houses all doors faced outside and neighbors were separated by thick walls. 
Spur-of-the-moment visits have decreased, door bells are rung, and life inside the
36. Going back to colonial times, Moluccans felt themselves engaged in status 
competition with "Indos," as Moluccans refer to Dutch-Indonesians. Moluccans 
generally look down upon these "Indos" and, in the past, few social contacts 
existed between the two groups. Among young people, a more tolerant attitude is 
developing, although the feelings of most of them can be best described as ambiguous. 
Intermarriage is on the rise but is still numerically insignificant, especially if 
compared with Dutch-Moluccan marriages. Intermarriage with other Indonesian 
groups is virtually unheard of since the Moluccans* arrival in Holland, but it used 
to be fairly common for KNIL soldiers to marry Javanese women.
37. Moluccans use the Dutch term "half-bloedjes" when referring to children of 
mixed marriages.
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house has become more hidden from public view. Without exception, people who 
remember camp life nostalgically tell how they miss the coziness and closeness, 
but they all have become more private.
The second change happened when increasing numbers of young married 
couples had to find residence outside the wards, which were full and, in accord­
ance with Dutch policy, not expanded. In the mixed neighborhoods outside the 
wards, privacy became even greater and social control from the wards almost 
impossible to enforce. Like their Dutch neighbors, Moluocans living outside the 
wards do not appreciate unexpected visits but expect their friends to phone first. 
In this setting, they were able to develop an individual lifestyle free from social 
pressure. Even alternate "Western" life styles like cohabitation became common, 
sometimes grudgingly tolerated, but often still fiercely resisted by their elders.
Those who moved on to the big cities became even more individualized and 
independent, with the anonymity of the city and its distance from the wards 
contributing to their independence. However, the ties with family and friends 
have remained very strong. The frequent cross visits allow the migrants to keep 
in touch with the community. They draw new strength from being Moluccan when 
visiting the wards, but they also bring with them new ideas and fashions, exposing 
the wards to the outside world.
The continued strong need for community feeling can be seen in the case of 
Lelystad, a brand new drawing-board city on the Flevo-polder, recently reclaimed 
from the sea. Independent of one another, about fifty Moluccan families settled 
in different parts of the town. Yet, they found each other, recently organized a 
cultural day, and now are in the process of establishing a community foundation.
Secularization
Hand-in-hand with increasing individualization came secularization. Long 
after Dutch young people fled the churches, Moluccan youths faithfully attended 
church. Virtually every child was baptized and just about everyone underwent 
confirmation (sidi). The latter ritual makes a person not only a full-fledged 
member of the church but is also a kind of initiation into adulthood. Thus, a 
person should not marry before he or she has been confirmed.
In recent years, church attendance among young people has been dropping and 
even the numbers of baptisms and confirmations are slowly declining. For those 
who stay away, Christianity has stopped being adat, i.e., they don’ t feel compelled 
to go to church just because the community expects it or because it is proper 
Moluccan behavior.
Some have stopped believing, others have chosen alternate faiths, and in a 
few extreme cases, people have rejected Christianity because they see it as a 
white religion which has been used as a tool of colonial oppression. Among the 
adherents of this theory, there are even some who have "returned" to what they 
believe is the indigenous religion of pre-Christian times.
The conservative church leadership, which has proven itself largely incapable 
of changing with the times, must, of course, take much of the blame when even 
many of those youths who still believe in Christianity have stopped attending 
services. Most services are held in High Malay, which is comparable to Church 
Latin, and, at best, only partially comprehensible even to the older generation. 
For the young people sleep on Sunday morning, after a long night at the disco, 
has become more desirable than attending a ritual which is, in their eyes, meaning­
less.
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Furthermore, the church—or better the churches, since there have constantly 
been schisms based on family feuds rather than dogma—do not address themselves 
to the social problems, such as drug addiction, which concern young people. 
Church leaders have also been trying to uphold the traditional lifestyle, going so 
far as to ban people who live together outside matrimony from participating in 
the Eucharist.
Summary
Since the hijackings there have been two major developments: one, a strong 
resurgence of Moluccan identity, including a reevaluation and reinterpretation of 
traditional values and customs; two, a greater willingness to accept permanent 
residence in the Netherlands with a resulting better adaptation to life in Dutch 
society.
These two developments are not necessarily in contradiction. If they continue 
along their current lines, the result will probably be that Moluocans will survive 
as a distinct ethnic group with a partially separate culture expressed through a 
distinct lifestyle, while at the same time they become functionally integrated into 
Dutch society.
Separatist Counterforces
There are also strong counterforces to a development along the above lines. 
One of them is the strong fatalism among a sizable group of Moluocans, particu­
larly among the young, who fear not only that because of their skin color they 
will never be fully accepted, but also that they have no chance for advancement 
in Dutch society. The statistics, which seem to support these fears, further 
contribute to their sense of fatalism. High youth unemployment, for example, is a 
severe problem in overall Dutch society but it reaches 80 percent in some Moluccan 
wards. The number of drug addicts, too, is four times the national average. The 
sense of hopelessness felt by many Moluccan youngsters with regard to their 
situation clearly influences the continuously high school-dropout rate amongst them.
Another counterforce is reverse racism. The search for identity has led in 
some instances (especially in big cities like Amsterdam, where such identity is 
hardest to maintain) to the concept of the "Super-Moluocan," a Moluccan Cfber- 
mensch, superior to others in every aspect.
Hatred for the Dutch keeps simmering below the surface, ready to boil over 
at any moment—even among members of Dutch-born generations. Teenagers, 
outwardly "Dutch" in their behavior, suddenly became consumed with hatred for 
the Hollanders when they spoke about Dutch treatment of their parents. Moluc- 
cans married to Dutch partners, some for over twenty years, often have expressed 
the same deeply rooted resentments and dislikes, often right in front of their 
partners. I know of one extreme case, where the Moluccan father tried to forbid 
his very light-skinned, half-Dutch daughter from marrying a Netherlander, merely 
because he was Dutch.
Continued self-imposed isolation seems to be another factor working against 
integration. Many wards remain islands of separatism in a Dutch sea, and many 
Moluccans living in Dutch neighborhoods have little or no contact with their 
white neighbors. True friendships and regular interaction with Dutch acquain­
tances are still exceptional—even for a large number of mixed couples.
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Finally, the great divisiveness within the Moluccan community and the lack of 
leadership have made concerted actions towards emancipation very arduous. 
Traditionally, disagreements between leaders have led to splits into ever smaller 
factions. Now most charismatic leaders of the first generation have either died 
or faded from the scene. In the general atmosphere of political exhaustion pre­
vailing since the hijackings, no new leaders of stature have emerged. The compe­
tent managers and technocrats running the aforementioned Moluccan Advisory 
Council have only partially filled the gap. Consequently, although they have been 
working for advances in the long-neglected socioeconomic arena, and although 
they can show some successes through pressure they have brought to bear on the 
Dutch government, they are largely Manusama supporters, and thus have not been 
able to get backing from other important factions.
A new political style seems to be emerging among those below thirty-five 
years of age. They are willing to discuss problems calmly and rationally and to 
listen to diverging viewpoints. They also have new concerns. Rather than entering 
national politics, they work at the local level, trying to improve the lot of the 
inhabitants of the wards instead of fighting the Dutch government. This trend 
goes hand-in-hand with the Dutch policy of decentralization. The danger here is 
that while local advances may be possible, emancipation of the Moluccan community 
as a whole may be stagnating.
Conclusion
Can the train ever be stopped again? Looking at the developments since the 
hijackings, I believe the answer is an emphatic "No!" The Moluccan train is 
running firmly on its Dutch tracks toward an as yet unknown destination. But 
the destination is still within the Netherlands.
Many young Moluccans have realized this, although they often state that they 
never will feel quite at home in Holland. The numbers of those who openly admit 
that they would not return to the Moluccas, even if an RMS were established, are 
growing steadily. Realistic enough to acknowledge that they have become too 
Westernized to adjust to life in the Moluccas, they are also realistic enough to 
know that they would not be welcome there. Only sentimental ties will remain in 
the future.
However, if we question whether new violence, like the hijackings, could 
happen again, then I am not as optimistic as some Dutch government experts who 
believe that this would be impossible. Flare-ups of violence, such as the most 
recent one in January of 1984 in the large ward of Capelle aan den IJssel bear 
witness to the volatility of the situation. The political problem still remains and 
as long as there is no peaceful solution, the explosive situation will not disappear.
